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IMPACT OF THE RECENT REFORM OF THE PORTUGUESE




The convergence of the public employees’pension system, the Caixa Geral de Aposentações (CGA),
to the rules applicable to private sector employees started in 1993. It was then established that the
pensionsof the CGAcontributorsenrolledsinceSeptember1993shouldbe computedusingto the for-
mula that applies to the General Social Security System (GSSS). More recently, the convergence has
been accelerated and was extended to public employees registered in the CGA before September
1993.In fact, thepublicemployees’retirementrequirements andpensionformulasweresubjectedto a
substantial revision, given the need to bring sustainable foundations to the social security system. The
revision came into force in January2006 (it waslater complementedbysubsequentlegislationin 2007
and 2008).
1
The purpose of this study is to analyse the effects of the reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação (the
Retirement Statute for CGA contributors) on the time-profile of retirements, initial old-age pensions,
and CGA pension-related expenditure (from 2006 until the system closes, as it will, given that the en-
rolment of new public employees in the CGAceased in December 2005). More specifically, the idea is
to quantify the impact of three factors: the rise in the age and career-length required to qualify for a full
pension; the change in the formulas used to calculate the initial pensions, including the introduction of
a sustainability factor; and the revision or elimination of special regimes applicable to some CGA
contributors.
In order to do so, it was used the «2005 Public Administration Human Resources Database», made
available by the Direcção Geral da Administração Pública (DGAP). This dates from the specific point
when the new legislation came into force (December 2005). On the basis of the information regarding
age, years of service, and professional category, it is simulated for each public employee the retire-
ment year, both under the current and the previous version of the Estatuto da Aposentação. Then the
initial old-age pensions (including the applicable sustainability factor, based on average life expec-
tancy in the retirement year) and the CGApension-related expenditure are estimated. It was assumed
that retirement only occurs when contributors qualify for receiving a full pension (or when they reach
the age limit). Therefore, the more recent change in the Estatuto da Aposentação that reduced the
minimum career-length required for retirement is not relevant for this exercise, since it implies
receiving a partial pension.
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(1) Law No. 60/2005 of December 29, Law No. 52/2007 of August 31, and Law No. 11/2008 of February 20.This study does not aim to predict the profile of retirements of CGAcontributors. In fact, in the past an
importantnumberofcontributorsretiredbeforecompletingalltheconditionsrequiredtobeentitledtoa
full pension, or on the basis of other reasons, such as disability. Moreover, some CGAcontributors are
not public employees.
2 There is also no attempt to carry out a welfare exercise regarding the employ-
ees affected by the legislative reform.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the database and the modifications intro-
duced to ensure its suitability for this study’s purpose. Section 3 illustrates the methodology, highlight-
ing the modifications to the retirement conditions and pension formulas introduced by the new
legislation. It also describes the procedure used to calculate a career advancement profile for each
professional category, based on the estimated relationship between service length and wage in De-
cember 2005. In section 4 the results of the simulation are discussed. Finally, section 5 presents the
main conclusions.
2. THE 2005 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION HUMAN RESOURCES DATABASE
This database comprises information dated from December 2005, including variables that allow to
classify public employeesin a variety of categories. In terms of central government, it does not include
military personnel and data on judges are incomplete. Furthermore, it does not cover the regional
government employees of the Região Autónoma dos Açores (RAA) and the information on local
government workers is only partial.
In order to undertake the simulation exercise, an attempt was made to obtain a proxy to the unknown
data (except for military personnel, whichwasexcluded from this study). The “1999 Public Administra-
tion Human Resources Database” was used to obtain data on local government workers and judges
3.
The information for the RAAwas obtained from the Ficheiro Central de Pessoal do Governo Regional
dos Açores (also dated from December 2005), made available by the DGAP.
The information for the different sub-sectors (central, regional and local government) wasput together
into a single database and then was treated. In particular, observations assumed to be errors were
eliminated.Moreover, it wasdetected the existenceof employeesoccupyingmore than one positionin
the Public Administration and, by consequence, with more than one observation in the database. In
these cases the observation corresponding to the longer career-length reported was selected.
It should be stressed that the reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação did not affect the workers who
met the requirements for obtaining a full pension by 31 December 2005. These werenot taken into ac-
countin the exercise.Additionally, as the simulationis onlyapplicableto PublicAdministrationemploy-
ees enrolled in the CGA, it was necessary to separate them from those registered in the GSSS. Since
thereisnoinformationinthedatabaseaboutwhichofthetwoentitiestheworkerbelongsto,itwascon-
sidered, as an approximation, that the enrolment in the CGA corresponds to the labour relationships
resulting from appointments, administrative fixed-term contracts and administrative fixed-term teach-
ing contracts. The simulation exercise was implemented for this group, consisting of 612 thousand in-
dividuals.
4
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2000),interms of thelegislationtheninforce. Informationonthenumberof employeesregisteredintheCGAbetween2000and2005wasalsotakeninto
account.
(4) Thisgroup,inadditiontotheindividualswhoalreadymettherequirementsforobtainingafullpensionin2005,addsuptoroughly617thousandemployees.
The number of CGA contributors working in the Public Administration (including military personnel, not considered in this study) was approximately 660
thousand at the end of 2005.Moreover, it is relevant to distinguish the individuals belonging to the so-called general CGA regime
from the ones enrolled in the special regimes. The distinction was made by reference to the reported
professional category (Chart 1). The special regimes considered in the exercise are those applicable
to security force members (GNR and PSP)
5, primary education and kindergarten teachers, and
nurses. These cover the majority of the public employees enrolled in the CGA but not included in its
general regime (see Chart 2 for the contributors’ distribution by these professional categories).
Finally, it is also important to establishthe contributors’enrolmentdate, specificallywhetherit occurred
prior to September 1993, since this determines a different formula for pension calculation. The ca-
reer-length reported by the majority of the individuals included in the simulation exercise (59 per cent)
implies a registration date prior to September 1993.
3. SIMULATION EXERCISE METHODOLOGY
3.1. Simulation of the annual number of retirements
Part of the effects of the revision of the Estatuto da Aposentação refers to the postponement of retire-
ment. Hence, a first step was to simulate the annual number of retirements under the legislation in
force until December 2005 and since January 2006.
Followingthe reform, for every CGAcontributor, the minimum age required to retire witha penalty-free
pension rises gradually from 60 to 65 years, at a 6 months per year rate, during a transitional period
that goes from 2006 to 2015 (see Table 1.1.1, in Appendix 1).
6 For the employees whose enrolment
date is prior to September 1993, the number of yearsof service correspondingto a full contributoryca-
reer also rises at a 6 month per year rate, from 36 to 40 years, between 2006 and 2013 (Table 1.1.2 in
Appendix 1). Regarding the contributors enrolled since September 1993, a career-length of 40 years
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Chart 1
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ENROLLED IN THE GENERAL
AND SPECIAL CGA REGIMES
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Chart 2
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ENROLLED IN THE MAIN
SPECIAL CGA REGIMES
Distribution by professional category
Source: Authors’ calculations.
(5) Guarda Nacional Republicana and Polícia de Segurança Pública, respectively. 666666666666666665555 5
(6) There is the possibility of reducing this minimum age limit, benefiting contributors with a relatively longer length of service.remains the minimum required to warrant a full pension, since the GSSS pension computing rules
were already applicable to them before the legislative reform.
It should be stressed that individual preferences play an important role in the choice of the retirement
momentwithinthe legalframework.The factors influencingthis choiceare subjective,henceconsider-
ing them in a simulation is difficult. In the performed exercise it is therefore assumed that public em-
ployees retire when they fulfil all the requirements to receive a full pension or reach the age limit (70
years, for general CGAregime contributors). As mentioned, there are public employees that belong to
special regimes and may retire on the basis of different conditions than those applicable in the general
CGA regime. For further details about these conditions, see section 4.2.
In order to simulate the profile of retirements, it was prepared an algorithm based on the legal retire-
ment conditions for the general and the special CGAregimes. Diagram 1 exemplifies this algorithm.
in which:
Agei = age of individual i in a given year.
Career-lengthi = career-length of individual i in a given year.
At = Minimum age required to qualify for a penalty-free pension in yeart.
Clt = Minimum career-length required to qualify for a full pension in yeart.
3.2. Simulation of the initial old-age pensions
3.2.1. Pension calculation
• Public employees enrolled until 31 August 1993
Prior to 31 December 2005 the pension computing formula applicable to employees enrolled before
September 1993 wasdefined in the Estatuto da Aposentação then in force. The initial pension amount
was given by the product of the wage received in the last position held, by the number of years of ser-
vice (with an upper limit of 36 years) and a 2.5% implicit pension accrual rate (corresponding to the ra-
tio between 90 per cent of the salary and 36 years).
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Diagram 1
In 2006: Age A i  2006
and
Career length Cl i  2006
In 2007: Age A i  2007
and
Career length Cl i  2007
i's retirement year:
2006
In 2008: Age A i  2008
and










...The reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação set down a new formula. The initial pension amount
corresponds nowto the sum of two components, multiplied by a sustainabilityfactor.
7 The first compo-
nent is given bythe product of the monthlywagein the last position held, bya pensionaccrual rate that
varies as a function of the career-length equivalent to a full contributory career (that rises gradually
from36to40years),andtheyearsofservicecompletedupto31December2005.The secondcompo-
nent corresponds to the product of the yearsof service completed since 1 January2006, up to the limit
requiredto be entitledto a full pension,bythe averagewageover that period,andan accrualrate. This
ratewas2%for theemployeesretiredby31December2007andthis ruleis stillinforcefor retirements
taking place after that date, as long as the individuals have less than 20 years of contributions. Other-
wise, the accrual rate is a function of the reference compensation. It varies between 2% and 2.3%, in
line with a regressive bracket mechanism indexed to the mandatory minimum wage (or the IAS)
8,a s
indicated in Table 1.3.1 in appendix.
￿ Public employees enrolled since 1 September 1993
For public employees registered since September 1993, pensions are computed, as previously, using
the formulas applicablein the GSSS. These formulas wererevised for the last time in 2007. For contri-
butorswhoseenrolmenttookplacebetween1 September1993and31December2001andwhoretire
by December 2016, the pension is the weighted average of two components.
9 The first one corre-
sponds to the product of the average wage over the best 10 out of the last 15 contributory years, by a
2% pension accrual rate, and the number of years of service, up to the limit of 40. The second compo-
nent is given by the number of years of service, up to the limit of 40, multiplied by the average wage
over the total contributory career and the applicable accrual rate (which is equal to 2% for the employ-
eeswith20yearsof contributionsor less; otherwiseit is determinedin linewiththe bracketmechanism
described). The weights correspond to the proportion of the years of service completed until and since
31 December 2006 in the total.
10
For contributors enrolleduntil 31 December 2001 but whoretire from 1 January2017 onwards,the for-
mula is the same. However, in this case, the first weight refers to the service completed up to 31 De-
cember 2001 and the second to the subsequent contributory years.
Finally, for CGAmembers enrolled since 1 January 2002 initial pensions correspond to the product of
the number of years of service (up to the limit of 40), by the average wage over the whole career, and
an annual pension accrual rate determined as explained above. The sustainability factor is also appli-
cable to this amount.
3.2.2. Computation of the reference compensation
Inordertosimulatetheamountoftheinitialpensions,it isnecessarytoknowallthevariablesinthefor-
mulas presentedin the previoussub-section.The lengthof service andagerequiredto be eligiblefor a
full pensionare determinedbylaw, whilethe ageandnumberof contributoryyearsat retirementare an
output of the simulation exercise. However, there is no information on the actual wages received
throughoutthe contributorycareer, and thus it is not possibleto compute directlythe different values of
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(7) Thesustainabilityfactorisapplicabletothepensionspaidfrom2008onwardsandisgivenbytheratiobetweenaveragelifeexpectancyat65yearsin2006
and average life expectancy at 65 in the year before the pension is paid for the first time.
(8) Indexante dos apoios sociais. 99999998888 8
(9) In the legal framework there are exceptions to this formula. However, since in the database there are no employees in such conditions, the respective
formulas are not presented. For greater detail, see Decree-Law No. 187/2007 of May 10, or Campos and Pereira (2008).
(10) In the exercise, for the determination of the weights, it was considered a maximum length of service of 40 years. Hence, for employees with a full
career-length, the second weight corresponds to 40 years minus the years of service completed up to 2006.the reference compensation. As an alternative, the salary earned in each contributory year was esti-
mated using regressions of the wage on the service length in December 2005, for the various profes-
sional categories
11. Given that in the initial and the final years of each career it is typically difficult to
estimate an accurate profile, the first four years,as wellas the ones beyondthe 36
th, wereaggregated.
Thus, the estimated coefficients capture the difference between the average earnings over the first
four yearsand in each of the followingyears,until the end of the contributorycareer. Then the progres-
sion profile resulting from this estimation procedure was smoothed and, in addition, it was assumed
that the salary remained constant upon reaching the respective maximum or, at the latest, by the 36
th
year (see Campos and Pereira (2008) for the results).
The wage progression profiles reflect the relationship between earnings and seniority that was ob-
served in 2005, meaning that the pensions simulated are also at 2005 prices.
12 Note that, even in real
terms, the relationship betweenwagesand years of service estimated for 2005 is different from the re-
lationships that prevailed in the past and willprevail in future, since real wageschange frequently. This
effectshouldbereinforcedbytheongoingrevisionofthepublicadministrationpayschedule.However,
it should be stressed that discrepancies vis-à-vis the 2005 wage level and/or progression profile have
a similar impact on the simulated pensions, in terms of both the previous and the current legal frame-
works. As the results presented always refer to the differential effect of the legislative reform, the
procedure followed should provide a good approximation.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Impact on the profile of retirements and initial pension for the general CGA regime
4.1.1. Time-profile of retirements
13
In the exercise performed, a first step was the comparison between the profile of retirements resulting
from the legislationin force before and after December2005 (Charts 3 and 4). The most obviousresult
is a shift to the right in the flows referring to the public employees enrolled before September 1993.
Such an effect becomes progressively stronger during the transition to the new rules, and it stabilizes
at the end of that period, in 2014-2015. While a rise in retirements is projected for the years subse-
quent to 2006 under both versions of legislation,this is less marked under the newone (Chart 4). Such
rise in the number of new retirees reflects the large number of workers admitted to Public Administra-
tion entities in the period following the April 25, 1974, Revolution. In Chart 4, the increase in the flow
spreads until about 2018, while in Chart 3 it ends in 2014.
Another consequence of the revision of the Estatuto da Aposentação is the elimination of the break in
the number of new retirees between2029 and 2033 that wouldhave happened if there had not been a
reform (Chart 3). This break would have resulted from the existence of different career-length require-
ments in the previous legislation, depending on registration date. Indeed, in terms of the legislation in
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(11) The following categories were considered: administrative staff, administrative court staff, auxiliary staff, craft workers, doctors, judges, medical support
staff, nurses, other court staff, professionals, other professionals, prison guards, security forces – higher ranks, security forces – lower ranks, teachers,
technical staff, university teachers, others – with university degree, and others – without university degree.
(12) Everyfinancialvariableinthisexerciseisexpressedat2005prices.Inparticular,theannualwagesusedtocalculatethereferencecompensationwerenot
updated in line with retirement year’s prices (as foreseen in the legislation).
(13) TheCGAhasmadeavailablethefiguresreferringtoretirementsin2006and2007.Asmentioned,thepopulationofCGAmembersisbroaderthantheone
considered in this study and there is a substantial number of early and disability-based retirements. Even correcting for these factors, the simulation
underestimates(by about 25 per cent) the actual flows for the two-year period. Presumably this stems from the fact that the service length reported in the
databasebysomeemployeesmayfallshortoftherelevantyearsofservice(becauseitdoesnotcomprise,forinstance,militaryserviceorthetimeservedin
entities later incorporated into Public Administration). This phenomenon does not jeopardize an evaluation of the effects of the legislative reform.force until 2005, the CGA contributors enrolled since September 1993 needed 40 years of service to
qualifyfor a full pension, rather than 36. Hence, in the projection performed under the previous legisla-
tion most of the employees registered before September 1993 would already have retired by 2029,
while those registered afterwards would not have fulfilled 40 years of service before 2033.
14
Chart 5 shows the difference between the flows of retirements, before and after the revision of the
Estatuto da Aposentação (computed from the preceding charts). It is noticeable that the shift to the
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Chart 3
PROFILE OF RETIREMENTS – LEGISLATION IN





































Enrolled since 1 September 1993
Enrolled until 31 August 1993
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Chart 4
PROFILE OF RETIREMENTS – LEGISLATION IN





































Enrolled since 1 September 1993
Enrolled until 31 August 1993
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Chart 5
PROFILE OF RETIREMENTS – IMPACT OF THE














































Enrolled since 1 September 1993
Enrolled until 31 August 1993
Source: Authors’ calculations.
(14) ThenumberofpublicemployeesenrolledsinceSeptember1993whoretirebefore2033isquitesmallandrefers,withnoexception,toindividualswhoreach
the age limit.right in the profile of retirements for employees enrolled before September 1993 generates a non-
negligible decrease in the number of new retirees in the 10 years following the introduction of the new
legislation. This decrease is then offset in the decade subsequent to 2025. Finally, for the individuals
registered in the CGA since September 1993, the legislative reform consists only in a rise in the mini-
mum age required for receiving a penalty-freepension, from 60 to 65 years. Therefore, although there
is a similar change in the profile of retirements, its magnitude is much smaller.
4.1.2. Retirement moment and initial pensions
15
￿ Public employees enrolled until 31 August 1993
Chart 6 shows the average delay in the retirement year and variation in the pension amount as a con-
sequence of the revision of the Estatuto da Aposentação, for employees whose registration date is
prior to September 1993. The retirees are grouped by retirement year in terms of the previous
legislation.
Chart 6 demonstrates that the reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação results, in general, in the post-
ponement of retirement for the general CGA regime employees enrolled until August 1993. On aver-
age, the delay corresponds to 3.5 years and increases gradually during the transitional period,
stabilizing around 4 years from 2015 on. No employees retire earlier than they would have under the
previous legislation and most of them (87 per cent) serve more time in Public Administration. Most of
those work 4 or 5 more years in order to fulfil the new requirements (Chart 7). The remaining employ-
ees retire when reaching the age limit; hence, for them the retirement year remains unchanged.
As far as the pension amount is concerned, the simulation leads to the conclusion that the average ini-
tial pension for contributors enrolled until 31 August 1993 tends to be lowerwhencalculated under the
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Chart 6
IMPACT OF THE REFORM OF THE ESTATUTO DA
APOSENTAÇÃO
CGA general regime, employees enrolled until August
1993
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The horizontal shift represents the average postponement of the retirement mo-
ment, whilst the vertical one measures the variation in the average initial pension.
(15) This section does not take into account the sustainability factor. The impact of its introduction will be analysed later, in Section 4.3.revised legislation. The average decrease becomes more noticeable the further from 2005 the retire-
ment takes place. This happens because the weight of the second component in total pension in-
creases over time, and a comparatively larger proportion of the pension is based on the average
earnings of the whole career. Nonetheless, the effects of the reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação
are relatively heterogeneous. Indeed, even though initial pensions in general decrease, this does not
happen for approximately 20 per cent of the employees. Such an effect is not shown in Chart 6, but is
clearly seen in Chart 8.
In order to explain howthe legislative reform influences the initial pension, a breakdownof its variation
in terms of the contribution of the relevant variables was undertaken.
16 The formula applicable before
the legislative reform was rewritten as the sum of two components, following the rationale underlying
the new rules. The first component concerns the length of service up to December 2005, whilst the
second refers to the subsequent service. The annual pension accrual rates are equal to 2.5% and the
reference compensations correspond to the monthly wage in the last position held, in both
components.
The difference between the initial pension computed in terms of the previous and current legislation
(P
Pand P
N, respectively) can be presented as:




dd d P r RC C
   

() () 11 22
12 2 2
    
d P2
   






2 (i=P,N) refer to the twocomponents of the initial pension, correspondingto the years of ser-
vice until and since December 2005;
Economic Bulletin | Banco de Portugal
Articles | Summer 2008
117
Chart 8
RELATIVE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE INITIAL
PENSIONS COMPUTED UNDER THE PREVIOUS
AND THE CURRENT LEGISLATION









retire with a full pension, thus excluding the ones who retire when they reach the age limit.d P1 represents the differential explained by the first component, due to the difference betweenthe im-
plicit pension accrual rates (the other elements do not change);
d P 2 is the differential explained by the second component, which can be split into:
d r 2 , referring to the impact of the change in the accrual rate applicable;
d RC 2 , corresponding to the effect of the change in the reference compensation;
d C 2 , reflecting the impact of the change in the length of service corresponding to a full con-
tributory career.
Chart 9 presents this breakdown (with the individuals grouped by the retirement year under the previ-
ous farmework).
The changes in the calculation of the reference compensation tend to result in a lower pension. In-
deed, since 1 January 2006, there are two reference compensations, one for each of the pension’s
components. For the first component, the wagereceived in the last position held remains relevant and
it doesnotchange.
17 For thesecond,it is relevanttheaveragewageoverthebestyearssubsequentto
2005 (considering the service length necessary to build up a full contributory career). This average
wage tends to be lower than the last salary received, which was the reference under the formula
previously in force.
As for the impact of the changes in the pension accrual rates, this is alwaysnegative. In fact, the appli-
cable rate under the previous legislation was 2.5%, whilst the ones introduced by the revision of the
Estatuto da Aposentação are lower.
18
It is worthnoting that the impacts related to the first componentbecome less relevant as the retirement
year moves away from 2005, as they affect a smaller proportion of the overall pension. The opposite
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Chart 9
BREAKDOWN OF THE AVERAGE CHANGE IN
INITIAL PENSIONS
CGA general regime, employees enrolled until August
1993
Source: Authors’ calculations.
(17) Sinceit was assumedthat from the 36th ththyear of the contributorycareeronwardswagesremainedconstant, the wagein the last positionheldis the same,
both in terms of the current and the previous legislation. 181818181817171717 17
(18) The first component accrual rate corresponds to the ratio between 0.9 and the years of service equivalent to a full career, which rise from 36 to 40 (Table
1.1.2, in Appendix 1). The second component rate varies between 2% and 2.3%.holds for the impacts related to the second component. This phenomenon explains whythe difference
between the pensions computed in line with the current and the previous legislation increases as re-
tirement draws further from 2005 (as suggested in Chart 6).
Finally, the variation in the career-length has a positive influence on pension amounts. As previously
shownin Chart 7, most public employeeswillextend their service period to fulfil the newrequirements.
For most of them, the impact of such an extension is more than offset by that of the other factors work-
ing in the opposite direction, and the pension diminishes when computed in terms of the new formula.
Nevertheless, in some cases, the career-length extension, combined with the new annual rates, may
result in global accrual rates that are higher than the previous maximum.
19 When this happens, the
pension computed under the new version of the Estatuto da Aposentação may be higher than the
amount resulting from the previous formula, even though the reference compensation and the annual
pension accrual rates decrease. These conditions are observed for about 20 per cent of CGA
contributors whose enrolment took place until 31 August 1993.
￿ Public employees enrolled since 1 September 1993
InChart10itisnoticeablethattherevisionoftheEstatutodaAposentaçãohasamorelimitedeffectfor
the public employeesenrolledin the general CGAregime since September 1993. In this case, the only
modification wasthe rise in the minimum age for penalty-freeretirement, from 60 to 65 years. This rise
in the age requirement tends to imply the extension of the contributory career and a consequential de-
lay in retirement. However, it was observed that such a delay amounts to less than 6 months on aver-
age, whilst the minimum age goes up by 5 years. This discrepancy is justified by the existence of a
large number of contributors whowouldretire withmore than 60 yearsof age, even under the previous
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Chart 10
IMPACT OF THE REFORM OF THE ESTATUTO DA
APOSENTAÇÃO
CGA general regime, employees enrolled since
September 1993
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The horizontal shift represents the average postponement of the retirement mo-
ment, whilst the vertical one measures the variation in the average initial pension.
(19) Theglobalaccrualrateistheproductbetweentheannualpensionaccrualrateandtherelevantnumberofyearsofservice.Inthepreviouslegislationitwas
equalto90percent(2.5%multipliedby36).Inthenewlegalframework,itisdeterminedbythesumoftheproductbetweenthefirstcomponentrateandthe
career-length up to December 2005 and the product between the second component rate and the subsequent years of service.legal framework, in order to fulfil the 40-year career-length requirement. Therefore, for these employ-
ees, the postponement of the retirement moment is not very significant.
Additionally, since the formula for computing initial pensions has remained unchanged, the impact on
pensionsis minor(notice, however, that it is nowpositivedueto the increasein the referenceremuner-
ation, as it will be seen). Indeed, for about 80 per cent of the contributors enrolled since September
1993, the introduction of the new legislation has a nil or almost nil effect on career-length and pension
amounts. For the others, there is an observable extension of the career-length and an increase in the
old-age pensions (Charts 11 and 12).
In order to analysethese results, a breakdownof the change in pensionswasundertaken. This is simi-
lar to the one previously mentioned for the contributors registered until August 1993. In this case, as
some individuals extend their career-length, the wages taken into account to compute the reference
compensations may differ, as well as the second component accrual rate. For the employees enrolled
betweenSeptember1993andDecember2001,the differencebetweenthe initialpensioncomputedin
terms of the previous and the current legal framework (P
P andP
N , respectively) can be represented
as follows (see Appendix 2):








() () 11 22
12 2
2
    
   







2 (i=P,N) refer to the twocomponents of the initial pension, correspondingto the years of ser-
vice until and since December 2001;
20
d P1 is the differential explained by the first component, due to the change in the reference compensa-
tion;
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PENSIONS COMPUTED UNDER THE PREVIOUS
AND THE CURRENT LEGISLATION




to December 2001 are the relevant ones for the first component.d P 2 is the differential explained by the second component, which can be split into:
d r 2 , referring to the change in the applicable pension accrual rate;
d RC 2 , corresponding to the change in the reference compensation.
For the employees whose registration occurred since January 2002, the computing formula has also
remainedunchanged.However, the reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação mayas wellresult in varia-
tions in the reference compensation and, by consequence, in the annual accrual rate. In this case:
dPPdd p
NP
rR C  ,
in which:
d r is the impact of the change in the pension accrual rate;
d RC is the impact of the change in the reference compensation.
Charts13and14showthat,foremployeesenrolledsinceSeptember1993,thedifferencebetweenthe
pensions computed under the revised legislation and the previous one is almost exclusivelyexplained
bythe changein the reference compensation.Given that employeesextendtheir career in order to ful-
fil the age requirement (as shown in Chart 11), the average wage over the best 10 out of the last 15
years and the average wage over the whole career tend to be higher. This outcome has a positive im-
pact on the pension amount. In its turn, such variation in the reference compensation tends to bring
down the accrual rates for the second component (for those enrolled until December 2001) and the
overall pension (for those registered afterwards). This effect is nonetheless small relative to that of the
increase in reference compensation.
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BREAKDOWN OF THE AVERAGE CHANGE IN
INITIAL PENSIONS
CGA general regime, employees enrolled between
September 1993 and December 2001
Source: Authors’ calculations.
BREAKDOWN OF THE AVERAGE CHANGE IN
INITIAL PENSIONS
CGA general regime, employees enrolled since
January 2002
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Chart 13 Chart 144.2. Impact on the time-profile of retirements and the initial pension for employees of
the CGA special regimes
21
This section presents the impact of the change in the retirement conditions and pension formulas for
the employeesbelonging to the most representative CGAspecial regimes: primary education and kin-
dergarten teachers, nurses, and security force employees. For the primary education and kindergar-
ten teachers, the career-length and minimum age required to warrant a full pension rise progressively
from 30 to 40 years (with the resulting gradual elimination of the implicit bonus)
22 and from 55 to 65
years, respectively. Moreover, it was also stipulated an alternative that will remain in force until 2010,
allowing retirement with full pension at 52 years of age and 32 years of career-length (as long as the
contributor had 13 years of teaching service in October 1989). In 2005 the maximum age until which
these employeescan remain in service wasalso raised from 65 to 70 years.For nurses, revisionof the
retirement conditions consisted in a gradual rise in the minimum age, from 57 to 65 years, and in the
career-lengthrequiredfor afullpension,from 35to 40years.Finally, for securityforcepersonnel(GNR
and PSP) the legislative changes were the increase in the years of service required for receiving a full
pension,from 36to 40, andthe reductionin the bonusappliedin career-lengthcomputation,from 25to
15 per cent of the actual period of service. Additionally, access to the pre-retirement situation
23 is now
possible only upon reaching 55 years of age – besides 36 years of service.
Note that for the employees of the special regimes enrolled since September 1993 pensions were al-
readycomputedusingtheformulastipulatedfor theGSSS. Nonetheless,thelegislationdidnotspecify
how that rule would be implemented in detail. In the exercise a career-length requirement of 40 years
wasassumed, but proportionatelyreduced in line withthe bonus that the legislationimplicitlyor explic-
itly foresaw for each professional group.
For the majority of the employees enrolled in the special regimes, the reform of the retirement condi-
tions generates a greater postponement in retirement than for the general CGAregime. Indeed, there
wasa reduction or extinctionof the bonuses appliedin the career-lengthcomputation, besides the rise
in the minimum years of service and/or age. On average, depending on whether the enrolment oc-
curred respectively before and after 1 September 1993, the time served is extended by 7.3 and 7.1
years for primary education and kindergarten teachers, 5.5 and 1.7 years for nurses, and 3.8 and 1.8
years for security force personnel (note that the corresponding values for the general CGAregime are
3.5 and 0.4 years). The public employees whose retirement moment remains unchanged, despite the
legislative reform, are basically primary education and kindergarten teachers covered by the men-
tioned alternative in force until 2010, security force employeesthat fulfilled the requirements to access
pre-retirementby2005,andcontributorswhoretireuponreachingtheagelimit(whenthelatterhasnot
changed by the reform).
In order to explain the variation in the initial pensions, breakdowns following the same rationale as for
the general CGA regime were undertaken. For more than half of the employees enrolled until August
1993, initial pensions increase (being that proportion higher than for the members of the general CGA
regime). In fact, in the special regimes, besides the direct positive effect of the career-lengthextension
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(21) For further details, see Appendix 1 and Campos and Pereira (2008).
(22) In the legislation in force prior to 2005 that defined the retirement conditions for primary education and kindergarten teachers and nurses there was no
explicitreferencetoabonusinthedeterminationofthelengthofservice.However,therewasanimplicitone,sincethoseemployeescouldretirewithafull
pensionwithouthaving36yearsofservice,asrequiredforthecontributorsofthegeneralCGAregime.Thisalsoappliestothetransitionalperiodsinstituted
by Decree-Law No. 229/2005 of December 29.
(23) Pre-retirementisasituationsimilartobeinginthereserves,inwhichemployeesarenotonactiveduty. Retirementwithafullpensionisguaranteedforthe
individuals who spend 5 years in pre-retirement.(including via de reduction of the bonus) on the pension amount, there may also occur an indirect ef-
fect. It results from the increase in the relevant number of yearsof service that may raise the reference
compensationassociatedto the last wage.This effect is particularlyrelevantfor higherranks of the se-
curity forces, for which the estimated wage progression profile shows salary gains at the end of the
contributory career. For the individuals whose pension decreases when computed in terms of the new
legislation, the predominant effects arise from the reduction in the accrual rates and the reference
compensation corresponding to the years of service since 2005.
The impacts on the initial pensions for the individuals enrolled since September 1993 are also hetero-
geneous. However, for most of them the pension amount increases. This effect is explainedby the ex-
tension of the period of service, brought about by the rise in the minimum age for retirement and the
reduction or extinction of the bonuses. Indeed, with the increase in the actual years of service, the
wages taken into account to compute reference compensations are typicallyhigher. Finally for a small
percentage of the employees registered since September 1993, the pension amount is lower when
calculated in terms of the more recent legislation. In particular, these are individuals who retire when
reaching the age limit, thus in the same yearin both versions of legislation.For the employeesin these
conditions, the actual career-length and the other relevant variables do not change. Nevertheless,
pension decreases, given the revision in the bonuses applied to the years they served.
4.3. The impact of the introduction of a sustainability factor on the initial pension
Since January 2008 pensions awardedto CGAcontributors are given by the statutory pension (result-
ing from the formulas already presented) multiplied by a sustainability factor. The factor is equal to the
ratio between average life expectancy at age of 65 in 2006 and in the year before the one in which the
pension is paid for the first time. It should be stressed that the legislation allows contributors to play
down the impact of the sustainability factor
24, but this option is disregarded in the simulation exercise.
As before, it is assumed that individuals retire as soon as they fulfil the requirements to warrant a full
pension, therefore accepting the penalty imposed by the sustainability factor.
The figures for the average life expectancyat the age of 65 weretaken from the mortalitytables under-
lying the exercise presented in Pinheiro and Cunha (2007). They allow the computation of the
sustainability factor applicable to the amount of the statutory pension for each year, from 2008 on-
wards. It is noticeable that the factor’s relevance increases as the retirement year gets further from
2008, since, according to the projections, life expectancy rises over time.
Chart 15 presents the reduction in the pensionsawardedeach year(the retirees are groupedbyretire-
ment year under the current legislation), as a consequence of the introduction of the sustainabilityfac-
tor. From now on, all public employees registered in the CGA are analysed as a whole, whatever the
enrolment date or the applicable regime. Adecrease in the average initial pension, approximatelyuntil
2034, results from the implementation of the new legislation, when the sustainability factor is not con-
sidered. From that year on, the opposite occurs, as the pensions awarded to employees registered
sinceSeptember1993- whichtendto behigherunderthe newlegalframework- becomepredominant
as shown in Chart 10.
As expected, the introduction of the sustainability factor has a negative impact on the initial pension of
allCGAmembersthat becomesmoremarkedas lifeexpectancyincreasesovertime. This impact con-
vergesto about20percent, andclearlysurpassestheonearisingfrom theotherlegislativechangesin
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(24) Specifically,bymeansoftheextensionoftheprofessionallifebeyondtheminimumrequirementsforreceivingafullpensionorthevoluntarycontributionto
a public or private capitalization scheme, in order to complement the pension amount.forcesinceJanuary2006.Takingintoaccounttheoveralleffectofthechangesinthecomputingformu-
lasandretirementconditions,thereisareductionintheaverageinitialpensionallthroughtheperiod.
4.4. The impact of the reform on pension-related expenditure
In order to estimate the overall savings deriving from the reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação, pen-
sion outlays for the retirees considered in this study were simulated, using both the previous and the
current legislation.The numberof yearsduringwhicheach individualreceivesan old-agepensionwas
computed on the basis of life expectancy at retirement according to gender and age (using Pinheiro
and Cunha’s projections). Taking into account the legislation in force up to December 2005, the
retirees receive their pension for 23 years on average. Considering the rules in force since January
2006, this figure decreases to 21 years. Pension-related expenditure was calculated for each year,
from 2007 until the system’s predictable closure. Then these annual values were accumulated (note
that they are at 2005 constant prices - see sub-section 3.2.2).
25 Chart 16 presents the savings that de-
rive from the introduction of the new legal framework, both in annual and cumulative terms, excluding
the impact of the sustainability factor. In order to provide a relative measure of the respective magni-
tudes, the amounts were divided by the 2005 GDP.
26
The reform brings about a decline in pension-related expenditure, and the resulting saving reaches its
maximum between 2015 and 2030. From 2040 onwards, expenditure slightly increases, mostly re-
flecting the fact that pensions computed in line with the more recent rules will have been, on average,
higher since the previous decade (as shown in Chart 15). The saving obtained is predominantly ex-
plained by the decline in the number of years during which the retirees receive their pensions.
In Chart 17 it is noticeable that the introduction of the sustainability factor sharpens the decline in an-
nualpension-relatedexpenditure,whichnowlastsoverthewholeperiod,insteadofceasingin2040.
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Chart 15
RELATIVE IMPACT OF THE LEGISLATIVE REFORM
ON THE AVERAGE INITIAL PENSION
Source: Authors’ calculations.
(25) It was assumed that the pensions (at 2005 prices) remain constant once they begin to be paid.
(26) The value so obtained is different from the one that would result from dividingeach year’s saving, expressed at that year’s prices, by the respective GDP.
This difference depends, particularly, on the discrepancy between the nominal variation in the compensations underlying the pension calculation and the
nominal variation in GDP, occurring throughout the time horizon considered relatively to 2005.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article attempts to evaluate the effects of the recent revision of the Estatuto da Aposentação.
Firstly, the profile of retirements and the initial old-age pensions were simulated, both in line with the
previous legislationand the current one, in force since January2006 (using the «2005 Public Adminis-
tration Human Resources Database»). Secondly, the impact of the sustainability factor on the initial
pensions was taken into account and the effect of the legislative reform on CGA expenditure was
gauged.
As expected, the reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação results in the postponement of retirement
(with a full pension) for most of the general CGAregime contributors. This effect is particularly marked
for employeesenrolled until August 1993. For the employeesenrolled in the special CGAregimes, the
moment of retirement tends to be more affected as a result of the reduction or gradual extinction of the
bonuses applying to the computation of the career-length.
In terms of the initial pension amount, the legislative reform has more heterogeneous impacts. For
most of the contributors enrolled until August 1993, the revision of the retirement conditions and com-
puting formulas has negative effects on pensions. However, in some cases, the extension of ca-
reer-length (including or not a bonus) determines a higher initial pension, compared with the amount
that would be obtained in terms of the previous legislation. For the majority of the employees of the
general CGA regime enrolled since September 1993 the effects are approximately nil. For about 20
per cent of the contributors pension slightly rises, as a consequence of the increase in the reference
compensation, in line with the extension of career-length (in this case, in order to fulfil the new mini-
mum age required to obtain a penalty-free pension). For most contributors of the special regimes, the
reduction or extinction of the bonuses results in a relatively stronger rise in actual career-length and,
consequentially, in the referencecompensations.This effect tends to causean increasein the pension
computed under the legal framework in force since January 2006.
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Chart 16
ANNUAL SAVING ON THE PENSION-RELATED
EXPENDITURE RESULTING FROM THE REFORM
(EXCLUDING THE SUSTAINABILITY FACTOR)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Chart 17
ANNUAL SAVING ON THE PENSION-RELATED
EXPENDITURE RESULTING FROM THE REFORM
(INCLUDING THE SUSTAINABILITY FACTOR)
Source: Authors’ calculations.The decline in the number of years during which retirees receive their old-age pension, in addition to
the introduction of the sustainabilityfactor, generates a non-negligibledecrease in pension-relatedex-
penditure, throughout the period, until the system closes.
To sum up, the reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação results in an extensionof the time served and in
a reduction in pension-related expenditure that are in line with the rationale for its implementation. In
practice, the delayin the moment of retirement and the saving maybe less marked than the simulation
results suggest, since, as mentioned, a significant number of employees retire before fulfilling the re-
quirements assumed. As for the sustainabilityfactor, it should be remembered that its impact at the in-
dividuallevel maybe playeddownthrough the alternativeslegallyset out for that purpose. These were
not considered in this exercise. Moreover, the profile of retirements is likelyto be very influenced in the
coming years by the recent change to the Estatuto da Aposentação, which has shortened the mini-
mum career-length required for retirement (with a partial pension).
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126Appendix 1 – Retirement conditions and pension calculation rules under
the new legal framework
1.1. Retirement conditions for the CGA general regime
1.2. Retirement conditions for some of the CGA special regimes
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60.5 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006
61 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007
61.5 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2008
62 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009
62.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010
63 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
63.5 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012
64 years January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013
64.5 years January 1, 2014 - December 31, 2014
65 years From January 1, 2015 onwards
Source: Law No. 60/2005.
Table 1.1.2
CAREER-LENGTH EQUIVALENT TO A FULL
CONTRIBUTORY CAREER
Career-length Transitional period
36.5 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006
37 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007
37.5 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2008
38 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009
38.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010
39 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
39.5 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012
40 years From January 1, 2013 onwards
Source: Law No. 60/2005.
Note: Also applicable to the security force personnel.
Table 1.2.1
RETIREMENT AGE: PRIMARY EDUCATION AND
KINDERGARTEN TEACHERS
Age Transitional Period
55.5 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006
56 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007
56.5 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2008
57 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009
57.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010
58 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
58.5 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012
59 years January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013
59.5 years January 1, 2014 - December 31, 2014
60 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2015
60.25 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2016
61 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2017
61.75 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2018
62.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2019
63.25 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2020
64 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2021
65 years From January 1, 2022 onwards
Source: Decree-Law No. 229/2005.
Table 1.2.2
CAREER-LENGTH EQUIVALENT TO A FULL
CONTRIBUTORY CAREER: PRIMARY EDUCATION
AND KINDERGARTEN TEACHERS
Career- length Transitional Period
30.5 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006
31 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007
31.5 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2008
32 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009
32.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010
33 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
33.5 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012
34 years January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013
34.5 years January 1, 2014 - December 31, 2014
35.25 years January 1, 2015 - December 31, 2015
36 years January 1, 2016 - December 31, 2016
36.5 years January 1, 2017 - December 31, 2017
37 years January 1, 2018 - December 31, 2018
37.5 years January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
38 years January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020
38.5 years January 1, 2021 - December 31, 2021
40 years From January 1, 2022 onwards
Source: Decree-Law No. 229/2005.1.3. Pension accrual rate
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57.5 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006
58 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007
58.5 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2008
59 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009
59.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010
60 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
60.5 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012
61 years January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013
61.5 years January 1, 2014 - December 31, 2014
62.25 years January 1, 2015 - December 31, 2015
63 years January 1, 2016 - December 31, 2016
63.75 years January 1, 2017 - December 31, 2017
64.5 years January 1, 2018 - December 31, 2018
65 years From January 1, 2019 onwards
Source: Decree-Law No. 229/2005.
Table 1.2.4
CAREER-LENGTH EQUIVALENT TO A FULL
CONTRIBUTORY CAREER: NURSES
Career-length Transitional Period
35.5 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006
36 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007
36.5 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2008
37 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009
37.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010
38 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
38.5 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012
39 years January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013
39.5 years January 1, 2014 - December 31, 2014
40 years From January 1, 2015 onwards
Source: Decree-Law No. 229/2005.
Table 1.3.1
DEFINITION OF THE REFERENCE COMPONENTS INDEXED TO THE IAS (OR THE
MANDATORY MINIMUM WAGE, WHEN APPLICABLE)
Components Reference compensation Annual accrual rate of pension
1st Component Until 1.1 x IAS 2.30%
2nd Component Between 1.1x IAS and 2 x IAS 2.25%
3rd Component Between 2x IAS and 4 x IAS 2.20%
4th Component Between 4 x IAS and 8 x IAS 2.10%
5th Component Higher than 8 x IAS 2.00%
Source: Decree-Law No. 187/2007.Appendix 2 – Breakdown of the impact of the reform on pensions
27
2.1. Public employees enrolled until August 1993
￿ Pension in terms of the previous legislation:
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where:
RC L is the reference compensation, corresponding to the monthly wage in the last position held.
C
P is the length of service required to warrant a full pension, which is equal to 36 years.
C1is the length of service up to December 2005.
C
P 2 is the length of service since January 2006 required to build up a full contributory career (36
years).
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where:









C1 is the length of service up to December 2005 (which does not change with the legal reform).
RC A is the second component reference compensation, correspondingto the average wageover the
bestC
N 2 contributory years since January 2006.
r
N
2 is the annual pension accrual rate applicableto the second component, whichis linked to reference
compensation and career-length.
C
N is the length of service required to warrant a full pension, which varies between 36.5 and 40 years
(see Table 1.1.2).
C
N 2 is the length of service since January 2006 required to build up a full contributory career (C
N ).
￿ Differential between the amounts:
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(27) Assuming retirement with full pension only.
(28) Sinceitwasassumedthat,fromthe36thyearofthecontributorycareeronwardsthewageremainedconstant,thewageinthelastpositionheldisthesame,
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2.2. Public employees enrolled between September 1993 and December 2001
￿ Pension in terms of the previous legislation
29
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1 is the first component reference compensation, corresponding to the average wage over the
best 10 out of the last 15 contributory years.
r1 is the annual pension accrual rate applicable to the first component, which is equal to 2% (it did not
change with the legal reform).




best 40 years of the contributory career.
r
P
2 is the annualpensionaccrualrate applicableto the secondcomponent,whichis linkedto reference
compensation and career-length.
C2 is the length of service since January 2002 required to build up a full contributory career() C .
C is the length of service required to warrant a full pension, which corresponds to 40 years (both in
terms of the new and the previous legal framework).
￿ Pension in terms of the current legislation:
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in which the variables have the same meaning as before, but refer to the values that result from the
current version of the Estatuto da Aposentação.
￿ Differential between the amounts:
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(29) As mentioned in the text, when computing each component’s weights it was assumed a maximum career-length of 40 years. Moreover, since only
retirement with full pension is considered, the breakdown does not apply to contributors who retire prior to 2017.dP P P
NP
2 22 which can be broken down into:
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2.3. Public employees enrolled since January 2002
￿ Pension in terms of the previous legislation:
PR C r C
P
A
PP   , where:
RC A




C is the length of service required to warrant a full pension, which corresponds to 40 years (in terms of
both the current and the previous legal framework).
￿ Pension in terms of the current legislation:
PR C r C
N
A
NN   ,
in which the variables have the same meaning as before, but refer to the values that result from the
current version of the Estatuto da Aposentação.
￿ Differential between the amounts:
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that can be broken down into:
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